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ABSTRAK 
Suwardjono (2003) menguji apakah terdapat perbedaan kualitas laba (earnings) antara 
perusahaan yang menggunakan metoda kos penuh (full cost/FC) dan yang menggunakan 
metoda upaya sukses (successful efforts/SE). Dengan metoda regresi untuk data kuartal-
perusahaan (pooled cross-sectional regression) dan data dari Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System (IBES), hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa reaksi pasar terhadap laba 
(diukur dengan earnings response coefficient/ERC) bagi perusahaan SE secara statistis 
lebih besar dibanding dengan reaksi pasar bagi perusahaan FC. Temuan ini konsisten 
dengan temuan dalam penelitian sebelumnya. 
 Temuan di atas menimbulkan pertanyaan (puzzling) mengingat pasar di bursa saham 
Amerika dianggap efisien dengan investor canggih sehingga pasar mampu untuk 
mengenali perubahan laba karena substansi ekonomik atau kosmetik. Penggunaan pooled 
cross-sectional regression dapat merupakan penyebab hasil yang meragukan tersebut. 
Catatan riset ini menyelidiki lebih lanjut hasil penelitian ini dengan menguji kembali 
hipotesis yang diajukan dengan metoda regresi spesifik-perusahaan (firm-specific 
regression). Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk merekonsiliasi apakah perbedaan reaksi 
pasar tersebut memang sudah semestinya atau apakah perbedaan tersebut semata-mata 
karena metoda pengujian. 
 Penyelidikan lebih lanjut menunjukkan bahwa dengan regresi spesifik-perusahaan, 
metoda FC menghasilkan kualitas laba yang paling tidak sama baik dengan, bahkan dalam 
beberapa hal lebih baik daripada, metoda SE. Hasil ini kontradiksi dengan temuan 
sebelumnya. Akan tetapi, tes spesifikasi model (Bartlett dan korelasi Pearson) 
menunjukkan bahwa pendekatan pooled cross-sectional regression menghasilkan estimasi 
yang melemahkan reaksi pasar terhadap laba perusahaan FC. 
Keywords:  successful efforts, full cost, quality of earnings, earnings response coefficient, 
cross-sectional regression methodology, firm-specific regression methodology, 
oil and gas industry. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Full cost and successful efforts are two 
competing accounting methods that account 
for exploration and development expenditures 
in the oil and gas industry. The Financial 
Accounting Standards Board recommended 
that all companies follow the successful efforts 
method by issuing the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standard No. 19 in December 
1977. This mandatory accounting method 
created controversy on the part of affected 
firms and academic researchers as well. The 
research issue was centered on the economic 
justification of the mandatory method. The 
question was whether the elimination of full 
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cost as an acceptable method of accounting for 
exploration cost would cause undesirable 
economic impact. 
Bandyopadhyay (1994) addresses the 
earnings quality issue by examining whether 
SE and FC earnings are priced differently by 
the market during 1982-1990 period. He finds 
that the pooled cross-sectional earnings 
response coefficients (ERCs) of SE firms are 
greater than those of FC firms over the entire 
sample period. Using The Value Line 
predictive measure, he shows that his SE and 
FC sample firms do differ in terms of earnings 
predictability. The mean SE earnings 
predictability is statistically greater than the 
mean FC earnings predictability at  = 0,05. 
The overall results suggest that the quality of 
SE earnings is superior to FC earnings. The 
findings support the early FASB’s argument 
that SE earnings are more useful to the market. 
Using cross-sectional regression, Suwardjono 
(2003) [hereafter SWD1] supports this finding. 
On the other hand, Duchac and Douthett 
(1995) examine how the choice between FC 
and SE methods of accounting affects the 
value relevance of earnings in the oil and gas 
industry. By estimating book valuation models 
and using data from COMPUSTAT for the 
years 1982-1990, they measure the strength of 
the association between annual security returns 
and earnings levels. Their results show that the 
association is statistically stronger (significant 
at  = 0,05) for FC firms than for SE firms in 
periods of declining oil prices and reduced 
exploration activities (1986-1990). The results 
support the argument advanced by Pincus 
(1993) that an accounting method (in this case 
FC) is chosen to reflect managers’ private 
information and expectations about the 
economic prospects of their firms. In other 
words, managers should have discretion to 
choose SE or FC to reflect managers’ private 
information and expectation about the firms’ 
prospects. 
While the issue of whether the market 
discerns differently to the quality of earnings 
by FC and SE firms is still debatable, the 
findings of Bandyopadhyay (1994) and SWD1 
are puzzling due to the fact that the market 
where the data originated is efficient and 
sophisticated. In such a market, it is 
conceivable that there should be no difference 
in reaction to the information conveyed by the 
earnings of FC and SE firms. Investors are 
sophisticated enough to distinguish between 
accounting numbers which reflect economic 
changes and those which reflect cosmetic 
changes. Therefore, it is imperative to 
investigate further whether the superiority of 
SE over FC method is due to substantive 
difference or due to model misspecification. 
It is specifically stated in SWD1 that one 
important limitation of his study is that pooled 
cross-sectional regression is used to estimate 
the association strength between unexpected 
earnings and stock returns. Cross-sectional 
estimations ignore across-firm differences in 
unexpected earnings variances which may 
affect the overall results. If these conditions are 
not met, pooled estimations may be 
misspecified and thus the results are 
questionable. Teets and Wasley (1996), for 
example, provide evidence that, under certain 
conditions, short-window earnings response 
coefficients estimated from pooled time-series 
cross-sectional regression [as applied in 
Bandyopadhyay (1994) and SWD1] are 
systematically smaller than corresponding 
averages of firm-specific coefficients estimated 
from individual firm time-series regressions. 
The purposes of this research note are to 
reevaluate and reestimate the models in SWD1 
by applying firm-specific estimation and to 
compare the results of both approaches. The 
estimation is performed to test the following 
working hypothesis: 
The association strength between 
unexpected earnings and unexpected 
returns is equal for FC and SE firms.  
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Literature Review 
SWD1 provides descriptions of relevant 
literature in the area of association studies in 
general and in oil and gas industry specifically. 
Association studies have progressed from 
evaluating the information content of earnings 
to investigating the earnings response 
coefficient. The need for a proxy for market 
expectation has afforded earnings forecasting 
an important role in the market-based 
accounting studies. Most studies show that 
analysts’ earnings forecasts are the best 
surrogates for market expectation compared to 
mechanical models. The relation between 
unexpected earnings and stock returns is not 
only a useful measure of earnings information 
content and quality but also a vehicle to 
evaluate a differential impact of accounting 
policy choices on the capital market. The 
theory and empirical results of the association 
and ERC studies provide a framework for this 
study. 
The application of association theory to the 
oil and gas industry’s FC and SE controversy 
ranges from assessing the economic 
consequence of the mandatory accounting 
change to examining the quality of earnings 
provided by firms adopting a different 
accounting method. Most studies in the oil and 
gas industry focus on the economic impact of 
SFAS No. 19 rather than on the information 
content or quality of earnings. Table 1 
summarizes the features of association studies 
and Table 2 summarizes the features of studies 
in the oil and gas industry. 
Estimation Issue 
Teets (1992) and Teets and Wasley (1996) 
find that firm-specific estimations are more 
appropriate and more robust than pooled 
estimation. This conclusion is robust when 
firms have heterogeneous firm-specific ERCs 
and unexpected earnings variances. This issue 
is very relevant since a linear relation between 
unexpected earnings and cumulative abnormal 
returns is assumed. Under certain conditions 
where the individual firm coefficients or the 
firm-specific variances of unexpected earnings 
are identical, the two methods will provide the 
same results. However, if there is a systematic 
relation between the firm-specific coefficients 
and firm-specific time-series unexpected 
earnings variances, any differences in 
estimates will not be random. Using random 
samples, Teets and Wasley (1996) find that 
ERCs and unexpected earnings variances differ 
cross-sectionally and ERCs are negatively 
correlated with unexpected earnings. This 
negative relation results in pooled estimates 
that are downward biased relative to the 
average of firm-specific estimates. They 
further suggest that before using pooled 
estimation, the equality of coefficients or 
unexpected variances and the relation between 
ERCs and unexpected earnings should be 
tested. When the equality and no-relation 
hypotheses are rejected, the pooled estimation 
model may be misspecified and results in 
incorrect estimates and inferences about the 
magnitudes and differences in ERCs across 
groups of firms. It is suspected that the 
puzzling results of previous studies asserting 
the superiority of SE method is caused by 
inequality of interfirm ERCs and interfirm 
correlation between unexpected earnings and 
ERCs. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Two important variables in ERC studies are 
abnormal returns as a measure of market reac-
tion and unexpected earnings as a measure of 
information conveyed by earnings at the time 
of announcement. 
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Table 1. Selected Research Studies on Association 
 
Theme/Study 
Sample 
period 
(size) 
Earnings 
variable 
Returns 
variable 
Returns 
accumulation 
window 
Association 
measure or 
test 
procedure 
Remark 
Information 
content 
 
Ball and Brown 
(1968) 
 
 
Beaver, Clarke, 
and Wright 
(1979) 
 
Fried and 
Givoly (1982) 
 
 
 
 
Hughes and 
Ricks (1987) 
 
 
 
 
Lev (1989) 
 
 
 
1946-1966 
(261 firms) 
 
 
1965-1974 
(276 firms) 
 
 
1969-1979 
(424 firms) 
 
 
 
 
1979-1981 
(677 firm- 
years) 
 
 
 
Various 
studies:  
1980-1987 
 
 
 
Income forecast 
errors 
 
 
Forecast errors, 
mechanical 
models  
 
Analysts’ forecast 
(Earnings 
Forecaster)  and  
time-series model  
errors. 
 
Annual forecasts 
errors from 
Earnings  
Forecaster 
 
 
Various 
 
 
 
Monthly abnor- 
mal  performance  
index (API) 
 
Monthly unsys- 
tematic  returns 
(market model)  
 
Monthly abnor- 
mal returns from 
a market model:  
CAR and API 
 
 
Daily excess  
returns and  
cumulative  
excess returns 
 
 
Various 
 
 
 
12 months 
 
 
 
12 months 
 
 
 
12 months 
 
 
 
 
 
1-5 days 
before and 
after earnings 
announcement 
 
 
Various 
 
 
 
Correlation, 
contingency 
table 
 
Spearman 
correlation 
 
 
Correlation 
 
 
 
 
 
Spearman rank 
order (non-
parametric) 
correlation 
 
 
Various 
 
 
 
Focusing on 
direction of 
association 
 
Incorporating 
the mag nitude 
of errors 
 
Superiority of 
analysts and 
mechanical 
models was 
evaluated 
 
Mechanical 
(fourth-quarter) 
forecasts were 
used as 
comparisons 
 
R
2
's vary from 
1% to 10% (See 
Note) 
Alexander 
(1992) 
 
 
 
 
ERC: 
 
Cho and Jung 
(1991) 
 
 
Teets (1992)  
 
 
 
 
 
Pincus (1993) 
1979-1988 
(4212 firm-
years) 
 
 
 
 
 
Various 
studies: 
1980-1991 
 
1975-1979 
(64 firms) 
 
 
 
 
1978-1982 
(351 firms) 
One-year ahead 
IBES and simple 
mechanical quar-
terly consensus 
forecasts 
 
 
 
Various 
 
 
 
Value Line 
forecasts errors 
scaled by prices 
 
 
 
Forecast errors 
from quarterly 
Value Line 
forecasts deflated 
by closing price 
before announ-
cement day 
One-year ahead 
IBES and simple 
mechanical 
quarterly  
consensus  
forecasts 
 
 
Various 
 
 
 
Daily abnormal 
returns 
 
 
 
 
Abnormal 
returns derived 
from the simple 
market model 
Various 
intervals from 
-1 to +40 
 
 
 
 
 
Various 
 
 
 
Five trading 
days covering 
form day -4 to 
the day of 
announcement. 
 
Two trading 
day from the 
day of 
announcement 
Parametric and 
nonparametric 
correlation 
 
 
 
 
 
Various 
 
 
 
Firm-specific 
regression 
models 
 
 
 
Seemingly 
unrelated 
regression 
Parametric and 
non parametric 
correlation 
 
 
 
 
 
Various 
 
 
 
Change in 
interest rate is 
included as an 
inde pendent 
variable 
 
The impacts of 
four accounting 
policy choices 
are simultane-
ously assessed. 
Independent 
variables 
included: beta, 
debt-to-equity, 
size, variance of 
unexpected 
earnings, and 
growth 
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Tabel 1 (continued) 
Selected Research Studies on Association 
 
Theme/ 
Study 
Sample 
period 
(size) 
Earnings 
variable 
Returns 
variable 
Returns 
accumulation 
window 
Association 
measure or test 
procedure 
Remark 
Hayn (1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kothari and 
Zimmerman 
(1995) 
 
 
 
Teets and 
Wasley 
(1996) 
1962-1990 
(9752 firms) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1952-1989 
(1017 firms) 
 
 
 
 
1971-1990 
(75 random 
COM-
PUSTAT 
firms) 
Level of EPS and 
change in EPS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EPS, price-
deflated EPS, 
change in EPS 
 
 
 
Seasonal random 
walk errors: un- 
scaled, price-
scaled, forecast-
scaled, and 
actual-scaled 
Level of 
monthly 
returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Price, returns, 
deflated price, 
and change in 
price 
 
 
Market model 
abnormal 
returns 
12 months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal-year buy 
and hold 
returns 
 
 
 
Abnormal 
returns  at the 
announcement 
dates. 
The use of funda-
mental ERC  
models to 
examine ERC  
differences 
between 
profitable and 
loss firm-years 
 
A framework for 
choosing between 
return &  price 
models 
 
 
A methodology to 
control the effect 
of inequality in 
firm-specific 
ERC and unex-
pected earnings 
variances across 
firms 
The use of funda-
mental ERC 
models to exami-
ne differences in 
ERCs between 
profitable and 
loss firm-years 
 
 
A framework for 
choosing between 
return and price 
models 
 
 
A methodology 
to control the 
effect of 
inequality in 
firm-specific 
ERC and 
unexpected 
earnings 
variances across 
firms 
 
Note: 
      Lev (1989) summarizes returns-earnings research evidence to assess the usefulness of earnings and research agenda in 
this area. Cho and Jung (1991) assess the progress  of research related to ERC. 
      Earnings forecasting is required in association studies. However, earning forecasting studies are not in themselves 
association studies. Therefore, they are not represented in this table. 
      The works by Bandyopadhyay (1994) and Duchac and Douthett (1995) are basically ERC studies. Because they have a 
special relation with other studies in oil and gas industry, they are not included in this table. Instead, they are listed in 
the oil and gas sample studies. 
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Table 2 
Selected Research Studies on Accounting for Oil and Gas Exploration Costs 
 
Theme/Study 
Sample period 
(size) 
Factors affected 
or dependent 
variables 
Theoretical 
framework 
Independent 
variables 
or determinants 
Research method 
or models 
Economic 
consequences: 
 
Collins and 
Dent (1979) 
 
 
Lev (1979) 
 
 
 
Kross (1982) 
 
 
 
DeAngelo 
(1982) 
 
  
 
May 14-May 13, 
1977 (FC=45, 
SE=18) 
 
May 9-August 29,  
1977 (FC=49, 
SE=34) 
 
1971-1978 
(FC=31, SE=16) 
 
 
1973-1980 
(FC=129, SE=117) 
 
 
 
Weekly risk 
adjusted returns, 
CAR 
 
Daily residual 
returns  
 
 
Daily and 
weekly returns 
 
 
Change of 
auditor 
 
 
 
Event study 
 
 
 
Event study 
 
 
 
Event study 
 
 
 
Incentives to  
change accounting 
variables lead to 
auditor change  
 
 
 
Release of the 
exposure draft and 
SFAS No. 19 
 
Release of the 
exposure draft 
 
 
APB memorandum,  
FASB exposure 
draft, ASR No. 253 
 
 
 
 
Analyses of returns 
 
 
 
Analyses of 
residual returns 
 
 
Intertemporal 
differences analyses 
of residual returns 
 
Profile analysis 
Larcker and 
Revsine (1983) 
 
 
 
 
Lys (1984) 
 
 
 
 
Accounting 
choice 
determinants: 
 
Deakin (1979) 
 
 
 
 
 
Lilien and 
Pastena (1982) 
 
 
 
 
Malmquist 
(1990) 
 
 
1977 
(FC=52, SE=42) 
 
 
 
 
1974-1979 
(89 FC firms) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1976 
(FC=25, SE=28) 
 
 
 
 
1978-1979 
(FC=63, SE=39) 
 
 
 
 
1985 
(FC=197, SE=119) 
Stock price 
 
 
 
 
 
Security prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incentive,  
political, and debt 
effects 
 
 
 
The exposure 
draft, SFAS No. 
19, and ASR No. 
253 are treated as 
events 
 
 
 
 
Rational economic 
behavior 
 
 
 
 
Political, leverage, 
exploratory risk, 
and consistency 
hypotheses 
 
 
Efficient 
contracting 
between economic 
agents 
Proxies for 
incentive, political, 
and debt effects 
 
 
 
Proxies for default 
risk, accounting 
impact and renego-
tiation cost 
 
 
 
 
 
Proxies for 
aggressiveness, 
capital need, size, 
and age of firms 
 
 
Revenue, debt/ 
equity, dry wells/ 
total wells, and age 
 
 
 
D/E ratio, source of 
debt, size, drilling 
intensity, and 
production intensity 
Regression model, 
stock returns are 
regressed on 
independent 
variables 
 
Regression of 
abnormal returns on 
independent varia-
bles for each event 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple 
discriminant 
analysis (MDA), 
dichotomous 
classification test 
 
MDA, N-choto-
mous probit 
analysis, and 
regression analysis 
 
 
Logit model 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Selected Research Studies on Accounting for Oil and Gas Exploration Costs 
 
Theme/Study 
Sample period 
(size) 
Factors 
affected 
or dependent 
variables 
Theoretical 
framework 
Independent 
variables 
or determinants 
Research method 
or models 
Earnings R 
esponse 
Coefficient: 
 
Bandyopadhyay 
(1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Duchac and 
Douthett (1995) 
 
 
 
 
1982-1990 
(FC=15, SE=20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1982-1990 
(FC=103, SE=63) 
 
 
 
 
Cumulative 
abnormal returns  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stock price 
returns 
 
 
 
 
Better quality 
earnings 
embody all 
value relevant 
events for the 
period reported 
 
 
 
 
Smoothing and 
noisy signals 
hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
Unexpected earnings 
at the dates of 
earnings announce- 
ments. Control 
variables: structural 
change, growth 
opportun-ities, beta 
risk, and earnings 
predictability 
 
Actual earnings/stock 
price per share, size, 
and change in 
earnings. Structural 
change is controlled 
by time partition 
 
 
 
 
Variations to 
standard ERC 
models. ERCs of 
FC and SE firms 
are compared. 
Result: SE  is better 
than FC 
 
 
 
Book valuation and 
com bined book-
earnings val uation 
models. 
Result: FC is better 
than SE 
 
Measures of Variables 
SWD1 uses two measures of unexpected 
earnings: simple unexpected earnings (SUE) 
and adjusted unexpected earnings (AUE). SUE 
for each firm-quarter is defined as (see SWD1, 
page 182 for description of the terms): 
pj
pjpj
pj
P
FA
SUE
,
,,
,

   (1) 
AUE is measured as a residual error of the 
following firm-quarter cross-sectional regres-
sion model (see SWD1, pages 182-183 for 
description of the equation terms): 
pjpjpj
pjpjpj
LAGANL
MVFA
,,4,3
,2,10,
             



 
 ...... (2) 
Abnormal return (AR) and cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) are measured using the 
following adjusted market model (see SWD1, 
page 184 for description of the terms): 
ttjtj RmRAR  ,,  (3) 



2
1
21 ,],[,
t
tt
tjttj ARCAR  (4) 
Significance Test 
To test the differential impact of SE and FC 
method on the quality of earnings, the follow-
ing pooled cross-sectional interaction model is 
estimated: 
qj
qj
qjttj
ACCT
AUEACCT
AUECAR
,3
,2
,10],[,
                      
                      
21






  
 ......(5) 
where ACCT is accounting method (1 if a firm 
follows FC method, 0 if SE method). The ERC 
for each group of firms can be stated in terms 
of 1 and 2. The ERC for FC firms (ACCT 
=1) is 1 and 2 while for SE firms (ACCT = 
0) is 1. Statistically significant 2 indicates 
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that there is a differential impact of FC and SE 
the quality of earnings. Using this estimation 
model, SWD1 finds that ERCs for SE firms are 
statistically larger (at a = 0.05) than for FC 
firms for two windows ([-2,0] and [-1,0]) 
before and one window ([0,2]) after the 
announcement date. These results are 
consistent with those of previous studies, 
especially Bandyopadhyay (1994).
1
 
Alternative Tests 
Another way to test the cross-sectional 
differential impact of accounting is to regress 
CAR on unexpected earnings using pooled 
cross-sectional data. This model can be 
expressed as follows: 
j,qj,q10]t,[tj, AUECAR 21       
(6) 
This simple regression model is estimated 
for each group of firms (FC and SE). Statisti-
cally significant Chow-F indicates that there is 
a difference in ERC between the two groups. 
The coefficient of adjusted unexpected 
earnings in equation (6) is the ERC. Teets and 
Wasley (1996) refer to this approach as cross-
sectional regression methodology (CSRM) and 
the ERC can be expressed in the following 
formula for finding the coefficient of simple 
regression: 


 
 



N
j
Q
q
qj
N
j
Q
q
qjqj
AUEAUE
CARCARAUEAUE
ERCCSRM
1 1
2
,
1 1
,,
)(
))((
          
 
 .....(7) 
                                                     
1 The same model is also estimated by substituting SUE 
for AUE. The estimation provides similar results. The 
similar results of using SUE and AUE may be due to the 
fact that both estimations use the pooled cross-sectional 
approach which ignores the variation in unexpected 
earnings across the firms. The rest of the analyses in this 
research note will focus only on the AUE. 
Firm-specific ERC  
Teets and Wasley (1996) demonstrate that 
firm-specific coefficients and variances do 
differ cross-sectionally and find that ERCs and 
unexpected earnings variances are negatively 
correlated. This negative correlation results in 
much smaller ERCs relative to the simple 
average of firm-specific coefficients. There-
fore, the alternative statistical test in this study 
is based on averages of firm-specific ERCs. 
Following Teets (1992), firm-specific ERCs 
are obtained by estimating the following 
model:  
q10q],t,[t AUECAR 21    
(8) 
where CAR[t1,t2],q is cumulative abnormal 
returns over the length of return interval from 
day t1 to day t2 relative to the earnings 
announcement date for quarter q. Equation (8) 
is estimated for each individual firm based on a 
time-series of available quarterly data. 
Coefficient 1 is a firm-specific ERC, relating 
unexpected earnings to stock returns. 
Coefficients 1 for the entire sample are 
partitioned into two groups based on 
accounting method. The hypothesis that the 
average responses to unexpected earnings for 
FC firms and SE firms may be stated in terms 
of comparing each group’s mean 1. Teets and 
Wasley (1996) call this approach a firm-
specific coefficient methodology (FSCM) and 
formulate mean ERC for each group of firms 
as follows: 

























N
j
Q
q
jqj
Q
q
jqjjqj
AUEAUE
CARCARAUEAUE
N
averageFSCM
1
1
2
,
1
,,
)(
))((
1
 
 .......(9) 
Statistically significant t-statistic for the 
difference between the two group-means 1's 
indicates that there is a differential impact of 
accounting methods on stock returns.  
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According to Teets and Wasley (1996), the 
CSRM ERCs and FSCM mean ERCs will be 
equal if the following conditions are met: 
(1) all firms’ ERCs are the same 
(2) all firm-specific AUE variances are iden-
tical, even if the firm-specific ERCs differ 
(3) there is no systematic relation between 
firm-specific ERCs and firm-specific 
variances of AUEs 
The FSCM ERCs will be systematically 
larger than the corresponding CSRM ERCs if 
the relation in condition (3) is negative, and 
vice versa if the relation is positive. Teets 
(1992) and Teets and Wasley (1996) state that 
firm-specific estimations (FSCM) are more 
appropriate and more robust than pooled 
estimation (CSRM) if the above conditions are 
not met. That is when firms have hetero-
geneous firm-specific ERCs and unexpected 
earnings variances. In this research note, 
Bartlett test [Neter and Wasserman (1974)] is 
used to test the homogeneity of variances 
across group of firms. Pearson correlation is 
used to test the relation between ERCs and 
AUE variances. 
Bandyopadhyay (1994) shows that the 
ERCs during relatively high level of explo-
ration activity are more pronounced than those 
during low level of exploration activity. Based 
on analyses of the number of active rigs and 
crude oil prices for 1984-1995, the periods 
1984-1985 and 1990 can be characterized as 
high level periods while periods 1986-1989 
and 1991-1995 as low level periods. To 
measure the impact of exploration intensity to 
the overall ERCs and to compare with cross-
sectional time-partitioned data in SWD1, firm-
specific ERCs will also be partitioned 
according to these time partitions. 
In summary, the hypothesis that there is a 
difference in ERCs between FC firms and SE 
firms is tested by estimating pooled cross-
sectional simple regression models. These 
simple regression results are then compared 
with the results of firm-specific estimations. 
Which result is more reliable will depend on 
whether the above three conditions are 
violated. 
Data and Sample Selection 
The data, sources, and sample selection 
procedure used in this note are the same as 
those used in SWD1. Specifically, ARs, CARs, 
AUEs are taken from the results of SWD1. 
Table 3 summarizes the results of sample 
selection procedure and data availability.  
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Table 3.  Sample Selection Procedure and Data Availability 
 
Panel A: Sampling Procedure 
 
IBES firms under oil and gas industry groups
a
 
     IBES firms under oil and gas industry groups that are 
     available in the COMPUSTAT/CRSP files 
 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP firms classified as oil and gas
b
 
     COMPUSTAT/CRSP oil and gas firms that are listed in the 
     IBES in other than oil and gas industry groups 
 
Oil and gas firms listed in the COMPUSTAT/CRSP/IBES 
 
Actual and forecasted earnings are available in the IBES 
 
At least 12 quarterly matched actual-forecasted EPSs are avail 
able between 1984 and 1995 inclusive 
 
Accounting method identifiable 
  
 
572 
 
 
 
1052 
 
 
 
 
466 
 
 
 
195 
 
661 
 
508 
 
 
324 
 
204 
 
Panel B: Data Availability
c
 
 
 
 
 FC  
 
 
SE 
 
 
Total 
Number of firms meeting the above criteria 
Firm-quarters with matched actual-forecast earnings 
Firm-quarters with matching announcement dates 
Firm-quarters with matching CRSP market values 
Firm-quarters with matching CARs 
Number of firms in the final sample 
106 
3389 
3380 
3134 
3031 
102 
98 
3349 
3272 
3198 
3114 
98 
204  
6838 
6652 
6332 
6145 
200 
a BES industry groups: 60101-60110, 60701, 60702, 110201, and 110202. 
b Based on the following SIC codes: Bituminous coal mining (1221), Crude petroleum and natual gas 
(1311), Drilling oil and gas wells (1381), Oil and gas field exploration (1382), Oil and gas field services 
(1389), Petroleum refining (2911), Oil and gas field machineries (3533), Pipe lines and ex natural gas 
(4610), Electric services (4911), Natural gas transmission (4922), Natural gas transmission and 
distribution (4923), Natural gas distribution (4924), Electric and other services (4931), Cogeneration-
Sm power producer (4991), Petroleum bulk stations (5171), Petroleum ex bulk (5172), Oil royalty 
traders (6792), and Mineral royalty traders (6795). These industries are also represented in Malmquist’s 
(1990) sample. 
c After actual extraction of data items from the databases. All figures, except for number of firms, 
represent firm-quarter units. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Pooled-Cross-Sectional ERC Tests 
Table 4 presents summaries of the simple 
regression results for return intervals around, 
before, and after the announcement date. The 
pooled cross-sectional ERCs for SE firms are 
relatively higher than for FC firms. The ERCs 
range from 0.0032 to 0.0343 for FC firms and 
from 0.0069 to 0.0794 for SE firms. The 
maximum R
2
 is 0.0134 for FC firms and 
0.0107 for SE firms. Thus, the explanatory 
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power of the models is relatively low. The 
differences in ERC are negative (higher ERC 
for SE firms) and statistically significant 
around the announcement date but the 
differences are reversed and statistically 
insignificant at and after the announcement 
date. These differences in reactions suggest 
that the market needs more time to react to 
earnings of FC firms which are on the average 
smaller firms. This interpretation is evident 
from the results at the announcement date. At 
the announcement date, in which the level of 
information is comparable for both groups of 
firms, the market reacts positively to both FC 
and SE earnings but the difference is statisti-
cally insignificant. As more information of FC 
firms gets into the market after the announ-
cement date, the market reacts more to 
earnings announcements by FC firms even 
though the differences are statistically 
insignificant.  
The results of time-partitioned estimations 
are presented in Table 5. The estimations do 
not provide apparent evidence that the levels of 
exploration activities affect the differences in 
ERCs between FC and SE firms. An 
interesting observation is that the reaction 
patterns for 1984-1985 and 1986-1989 are 
somewhat similar but different from the 
patterns for 1990 and 1991-1995. In the first 
two periods, on the average the market reacts 
more to SE firms before the announcement 
date but then the differences disappear at and 
after the announcement date. In the last two 
periods, on the other hand, the market reacts 
more to SE firms for almost all return intervals 
and in most cases the differences are 
statistically significant. Time partitioning 
estimations fail to support the finding that 
differences in ERC between FC firms and SE 
firms are more pronounced during periods of 
high activities.  
The simple regression model estimations 
provide similar results to those of interaction 
models discussed in SWD1. The pooled cross-
sectional estimation approach together with the 
differences in reaction lag might have 
explained the previous finding that the market 
reacts more to earnings of SE firms. Again, it 
should be noted that pooled cross-sectional 
estimations ignore across-firm differences in 
unexpected earnings variances which may 
affect the overall results. If these conditions are 
not taken into account, pooled estimations may 
be misspecified and thus the results are 
questionable. 
 
Table 4. Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression Coefficients (ERCs) for the Entire Period: Model (6) 
Window 
Full Cost Successful Efforts 
Chow-F Difference
a
 
ERC Adj-R
2
 ERC Adj-R
2
 
[-4,+4] 
[-2,+2] 
[-1,+1] 
[0] 
[-2,0] 
[-1,0] 
[0,+1] 
[0,+2] 
0.0343 
0.0200 
0.0061 
0.0192 
0.0236 
0.0032 
0.0151 
0.0239 
0.0098 
0.0047 
0.0003 
0.0134 
0.0106 
-0.0001 
0.0061 
0.0102 
0.0381 
0.0794 
0.0323 
0.0069 
0.0629 
0.0295 
0.0097 
0.0235 
0.0014 
0.0107 
0.0023 
-0.0000 
0.0104 
0.0027 
0.0001 
0.0012 
0.07 
       13.80*   
         4.09** 
1.85 
    9.26** 
    5.64** 
0.18 
0.01 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
aA positive difference indicates that ERC for FC firms is greater than ERC for SE firms. 
  * Statistically significant at p < 0.01 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.05 
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Table 5. Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression Coefficients for Each Time Partition  
 
Window 
Full Cost Successful Efforts 
Chow-F Differencea 
ERC Adj-R2 ERC Adj-R2 
1984-1985: 
[-4,+4] 
[-2,+2] 
[-1,+1] 
[0] 
[-2,0] 
[-1,0] 
[0,+1] 
[0,+2] 
1986-1989: 
[-4,+4] 
[-2,+2] 
[-1,+1] 
[0] 
[-2,0] 
[-1,0] 
[0,+1] 
[0,+2] 
1990: 
[-4,+4] 
[-2,+2] 
[-1,+1] 
[0] 
[-2,0] 
[-1,0] 
[0,+1] 
[0,+2] 
1991-1995: 
[-4,+4] 
[-2,+2] 
[-1,+1] 
[0] 
[-2,0] 
[-1,0] 
[0,+1] 
[0,+2] 
 
0.0830 
0.0462 
0.0310 
0.0417 
0.0402 
0.0206 
0.0340 
0.0557 
 
0.0012 
0.0003 
-0.0152 
0.0033 
0.0119 
-0.0113 
0.0033 
-0.0001 
 
0.0871 
0.1392 
0.1171 
0.0417 
0.0891 
0.1310 
0.0806 
0.1781 
 
0.0341 
0.0206 
0.0707 
0.0326 
0.0095 
0.0143 
-0.0304 
0.0238 
 
0.2130 
0.1113 
0.0652 
0.2267 
0.1122 
0.0381 
0.1127 
0.2331 
 
-0.0011 
-0.0011 
0.0091 
0.0001 
0.0031 
0.0050 
-0.0004 
-0.0011 
 
0.0040 
0.0333 
0.0229 
-0.0008 
0.0167 
0.0412 
0.0220 
0.0829 
 
-0.0001 
-0.0004 
0.0033 
0.0016 
-0.0005 
-0.0003 
0.0005 
-0.0002 
 
0.0498 
-0.0058 
0.1272 
0.0595 
0.0409 
0.0852 
0.1015 
0.0128 
 
-0.0022 
0.0747 
-0.0275 
-0.0236 
0.0341 
-0.0194 
-0.0317 
0.0169 
 
0.3434 
0.1599 
0.1297 
0.1538 
0.2468 
0.1682 
0.1152 
0.0668 
 
0.2367 
0.2815 
0.2289 
0.0760 
0.2681 
0.2220 
0.0891 
0.0895 
 
0.0018 
-0.0031 
0.0670 
0.0374 
0.0056 
0.0423 
0.0652 
-0.0023 
 
-0.0010 
0.0210 
0.0034 
0.0074 
0.0063 
0.0023 
0.0068 
0.0009 
 
0.0185 
0.0025 
0.0040 
0.0197 
0.0199 
0.0128 
0.0042 
-0.0020 
 
0.0137 
0.0287 
0.0258 
0.0066 
0.0395 
0.0331 
0.0049 
0.0042 
 
0.66 
2.52 
11.33* 
0.91 
0.01 
6.94* 
8.40* 
2.78 
 
2.00 
28.40* 
1.17 
1.57 
13.58* 
2.85 
2.02 
2.24 
 
11.67* 
14.29* 
8.49* 
4.08** 
33.10* 
19.61* 
7.07* 
0.17 
 
9.88* 
19.24* 
10.96* 
2.63 
35.65* 
28.24* 
9.90* 
2.10 
 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
aA positive difference indicates that ERC for FC firms is greater than ERC for SE firms. 
  * Statistically significant at p < 0.01 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.05 
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Firm-Specific Analyses 
The average estimations for each group of 
firms and for several return intervals are 
presented in Table 6. The ERCs range from 
0.1878 to 0.5829 for FC firms and from 0.0117 
to 0.4452 for SE firms. These ERCs are five to 
seventeen times higher than the ERCs of the 
pooled cross-sectional regressions. The R
2
's 
are still low with the maximums of 0.0244 for 
FC firms and 0.0333 for SE firms. The ERCs 
for FC firms are higher than those of FC firms 
for most intervals. The ERCs for FC firms are 
statistically higher than those for SE firms at 
the event day and in the intervals after the 
announcement date. This suggests that the 
market needs more time to react to earnings of 
FC firms which are on the average smaller 
firms. As more information of FC firms arrives 
into the market after the announcement date, 
the market reacts more to earnings releases by 
FC firms. 
 
Table 6. Mean ERCs from Firm-Specific Regressions for the Entire Period  
Window 
Full  Cost Successful Efforts 
ta 
ERC Adj-R2 ERC Adj-R2 
[-4,+4] 
[-2,+2] 
[-1,+1] 
[0] 
[-2,0] 
[-1,0] 
[0,+1] 
[0,+2] 
0.5829 
0.3508 
0.3265 
0.2132 
0.1878 
0.2135 
0.3599 
0.3420 
0.0129 
0.0239 
0.0172 
0.0244 
0.0108 
0.0173 
0.0190 
0.0208 
0.4452 
0.2600 
0.2424 
0.0575 
0.3058 
0.2123 
0.0877 
0.0117 
0.0250 
0.0233 
0.0333 
0.0213 
0.0280 
0.0307 
0.0247 
0.0112 
0.75 
0.65 
0.82 
    2.08** 
-0.93 
0.01 
    2.51** 
    2.43** 
at- statistic for the difference in ERC. 
  * Statistically significant at p < 0.01 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.05 
 
Side-by-side comparisons of the results 
from pooled and firm-specific estimations are 
shown in Table 7. Opposite to the results from 
pooled estimations, the ERCs for FC firms 
from firm-specific estimations are relatively 
higher in almost all return intervals. Standard 
t-tests for differences in mean ERCs indicate 
that the differences are statistically significant 
at and after the announcement date (return 
intervals [0], [0,1], and [0,2]). The difference 
for [-2,0] return interval is negative. However, 
unlike Bandyopadhyay’s (1994) finding, the 
difference is statistically insignificant. While 
ERCs for SE firms are higher before the 
announcement date under pooled cross-
sectional model, the ERCs are lower at and 
after the announcement date under firm-
specific model. 
Teets and Wasley (1996) find that the 
means of the firm-specific ERCs are, on the 
average, 13 times larger than the corres-
ponding pooled cross-sectional ERCs for 
random samples and about five times larger for 
regulated and nonregulated firms. Consistent 
with these results, Table 7 also shows that 
ERCs for FC and SE firms under firm-specific 
coefficients are larger than those under cross-
sectional coefficients. On the average (across 
return intervals), the firm-specific ERCs for 
FC (SE) firms are about 17 (5) times larger 
than for cross-sectional ERCs for FC (SE) 
firms. Firm-specific estimations also somewhat 
increase the magnitude of R
2
. On the average, 
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R
2
 increases 2.67 times (from 0.0069 to 
0.0183) for FC firms and 6.86 times (from 
0.0036 to 0.0247) for SE firms. Thus, firm-
specific models better explain the variation of 
abnormal returns. 
Table 8 presents the results for firm-
specific estimations using time-partitioned 
data. The results, however, should be 
interpreted with caution since partitioning 
firm-specific estimation into four subperiods 
leaves high periods (1984-1985 and 1990) with 
only five observations or fewer for each firm. 
Given this limitation, there is no apparent 
evidence that levels of activities affect the 
overall results. In all four subperiods, no 
difference in ERC is statistically significant 
although in most cases ERCs for FC firms are 
lower than for SE firms. The levels of 
significance, however, differ from the results 
of pooled cross-sectional estimations in Table 
4 in which the SE firms dominate FC firms in 
the market sensitivity to unexpected earnings 
not only in magnitude but also in statistical 
significance especially for subperiods 1990 
and 1991-1995. 
 
Table 7. Comparions of Results for Pooled Cross-Sectional and Firm-Specific 
Estimations for the Entire Period 
Return 
interval 
Cross-sectional coefficients Firm-specific coefficients 
FC SE  Differencea FC SE  Differenceb 
[-4,+4] 
[-2,+2] 
[-1,+1] 
[0] 
[-2,0] 
[-1,0] 
[0,+1] 
[0,+2] 
0.0343 
0.0200 
0.0061 
0.0192 
0.0236 
0.0032 
0.0151 
0.0239 
0.0381 
0.0794 
0.0323 
0.0069 
0.0629 
0.0295 
0.0097 
0.0235 
 -0.0038 
 -0.0594* 
   -0.0262** 
0.0123 
   -0.0393** 
   -0.0263** 
0.0054 
0.0004 
0.5829 
0.3508 
0.3265 
0.2132 
0.1878 
0.2135 
0.3599 
0.3420 
0.4452 
0.2600 
0.2424 
0.0575 
0.3058 
0.2123 
0.0877 
0.0117 
 0.1377 
0.0908 
0.0841 
     0.1557** 
-0.1180 
 0.0012 
     0.2722** 
     0.3303** 
 
    a Chow test is used to measure the statistical significance of the difference. 
    b Standard t-test procedure is performed to test the statistical significance of the difference. 
  * Statistically significant at p < 0.01 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.05 
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Table 8. Mean ERCs from Firm-Specific Regressions for Each Time Partition 
 
Window 
Full Cost Successful Efforts ta 
ERC Adj-R2 ERC Adj-R2  
1984-1985: 
[-4,+4] 
[-2,+2] 
[-1,+1] 
[0] 
[-2,0] 
[-1,0] 
[0,+1] 
[0,+2] 
 
1986-1989: 
[-4,+4] 
[-2,+2] 
[-1,+1] 
[0] 
[-2,0] 
[-1,0] 
[0,+1] 
[0,+2] 
 
1990: 
[-4,+4] 
[-2,+2] 
[-1,+1] 
[0] 
[-2,0] 
[-1,0] 
[0,+1] 
[0,+2] 
 
1991-1995: 
[-4,+4] 
[-2,+2] 
[-1,+1] 
[0] 
[-2,0] 
[-1,0] 
[0,+1] 
[0,+2] 
 
-0.0444 
-0.0776 
-0.2074 
0.0582 
0.0671 
0.0954 
-0.0470 
-0.1769 
 
 
0.1687 
0.3014 
0.3635 
0.1737 
0.1508 
0.2386 
0.2502 
0.2341 
 
 
1.0805 
1.9989 
1.1127 
-0.0752 
0.9595 
0.3751 
0.4712 
0.7783 
 
 
0.8847 
0.5206 
0.5744 
0.3651 
0.3616 
0.4107 
0.5750 
0.5148 
 
-0.0615 
-0.0456 
0.0163 
0.0468 
-0.0485 
-0.0583 
0.0709 
0.0166 
 
 
-0.0134 
0.0316 
0.0449 
0.0611 
0.0280 
0.0507 
0.0454 
0.0453 
 
 
-0.0630 
0.0114 
0.0176 
-0.0345 
0.0374 
0.0101 
0.0183 
-0.0921 
 
 
0.0109 
0.0197 
0.0135 
0.0254 
0.0223 
0.0161 
0.0271 
0.0251 
 
0.1935 
0.1609 
0.0240 
0.0661 
0.3278 
0.1926 
-0.1025 
-0.1008 
 
 
0.4097 
0.3000 
0.1953 
0.0285 
0.3539 
0.2237 
0.0001 
-0.0254 
 
 
1.4631 
0.6591 
1.3488 
0.6821 
1.4179 
1.5371 
0.4937 
-0.0767 
 
 
1.2852 
0.9968 
0.7316 
0.3283 
0.9028 
0.7058 
0.3541 
0.4223 
 
0.0112 
0.0416 
0.0808 
0.0485 
0.0880 
0.1205 
0.0757 
0.0626 
 
 
0.0137 
0.0029 
0.0124 
-0.0069 
0.0176 
0.0017 
-0.0138 
-0.0084 
 
 
-0.0013 
0.0545 
0.0496 
0.1233 
0.0454 
0.0910 
0.1088 
0.1332 
 
 
0.0372 
0.0325 
0.0396 
0.0373 
0.0462 
0.0422 
0.0214 
0.0024 
 
-0.37 
-0.81 
-0.67 
-0.05 
-0.95 
-0.40 
0.20 
-0.26 
 
 
-0.69 
0.01 
0.98 
1.23 
-1.18 
0.11 
1.52 
1.34 
 
 
-0.26 
1.08 
-0.25 
-0.98 
-0.46 
-0.42 
-0.02 
0.72 
 
 
-1.01 
-1.33 
-0.46 
0.18 
-1.71 
-1.08 
0.91 
0.34 
at-statistic for the difference in ERC, statistically significant at | t | > 1.96 (< 0.05) 
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Specification Tests 
The above analyses show that two different 
estimation approaches result in two different 
outcomes. Pooled cross-sectional estimations 
provide a general inference that the ERCs for 
SE firms are statistically larger than for FC 
firms while firm-specific estimations provide 
an opposite conclusion or at least a different 
conclusion that ERCs for SE firms are not 
statistically larger than for FC firms for the 
announcement dates and for intervals follow-
ing the announcements. The opposite or 
different results may be attributed to differen-
ces in the speed by which information gets into 
the market for FC and SE firms. These diffe-
rences are mitigated by adjusting the unex-
pected earnings measure using an earnings 
expectation model at the date of earnings 
announcement. This refinement however may 
not capture the lag in information speed. 
Another plausible explanation is that the 
pooled cross-sectional estimations are misspe-
cified due to cross-sectional heterogeneity in 
firm-specific ERCs or unexpected earnings 
variances. If equality of coefficients (of firm-
specific unexpected earnings variances) is 
rejected, it is likely that cross-sectional 
estimates of coefficients are downward biased 
especially for a group with less homogeneity. 
To test the validity of this argument, 
Bartlett test is performed to determine if AUE 
variances are homogeneous across firms in 
each group (FC and SE). B-statistics of Bartlett 
test (equivalent to 2) are 12,727.0 for FC 
group and 7,639.0 for SE group. Both statistics 
are statistically significant at less than 0.01 
level with 101 and 97 degrees of freedom, 
respectively. These statistics indicate that FC 
firms are more heterogeneous than SE firms. 
To assess the severity of unequal AUE 
variances in biasing coefficients downward, a 
correlation analysis is performed. Table 9 
presents coefficients of correlation between 
firm-specific ERCs and AUE variances for 
each group of firms. The results indicate that in 
all cases ERCs are negatively related to AUE 
variances. More importantly, in most cases 
where the correlations are statistically 
significant for FC firms, the coefficients are 
also higher for FC firms (return intervals [-
4,+4], [-2,+2], and [0,2]). This higher 
associations for FC firms might have caused 
unduly downward-biased estimates of FC 
firms and thus result in statistically significant 
lower full cost ERCs under pooled cross-
sectional estimations. Indeed, the use of firm-
specific estimation approach is a way to 
control for the impact of across-firm unequal 
AUE variances. This research note provides 
evidence that firm-specific ERCs of FC and SE 
firms are almost twenty times higher than 
those ERCs based on pooled cross-sectional 
regression. Also, firm-specific ERCs for FC 
firms are statistically higher than firm-specific 
ERCs for SE firms for the announcement date 
and following the earnings announcement. 
Table 9.  Pearson Corelations Between Firm-Specific ERCs and Adjusted 
Unexpected Earnings Variances       
Return 
internal 
Full Cost Successful Efforts 
Coefficient Prob > | t | Coefficient Prob > | t | 
[-4,+4] 
[-2,+2] 
[-1,+1] 
[0] 
[-2,0] 
[-1,0] 
[0,+1] 
[0,+2] 
-0.3646 
-0.4431 
-0.2012 
-0.1017 
-0.1682 
-0.2475 
-0.0754 
-0.4702 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0426 
0.3089 
0.0910 
0.0121 
0.4511 
0.0001 
-0.1878 
-0.1937 
-0.2056 
-0.1710 
-0.2340 
-0.2696 
-0.1592 
-0.1196 
0.0640 
0.0560 
0.0422 
0.0923 
0.0204 
0.0073 
0.1173 
0.2402 
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In summary, the results of this research note 
demonstrate that the market reacts stronger to 
FC earnings than to SE earnings when firm-
specific estimation models are applied. These 
results contradict those of pooled cross-
sectional estimations. However, the Bartlett 
test reveals that the firm-specific estimation 
approach is more robust and better specified 
than the pooled cross-sectional approach. 
Therefore, this note rejects the hypothesis of 
equal ERCs between FC firms and SE firms 
and concludes that ERCs for FC firms are 
higher than those for SE firms. The implication 
of this finding is discussed in the following 
conclusions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Pooled cross-sectional and firm-specific 
simple regressions are estimated for measuring 
the magnitude of earnings response 
coefficients (ERCs) of FC and SE firms. 
Estimations of simple regression models using 
a pooled cross-sectional approach produce 
results supporting previous findings that ERCs 
for SE firms are higher than those for FC 
firms. The differences in ERCs are statistically 
significant only for return intervals before (and 
including) the announcement date. When firm-
specific estimations are performed, the 
significance of the differences dissipates and 
the ERCs for FC firms are higher than those of 
SE firms for return intervals after (and 
including) the announcement date. Further 
specification tests reveal that the unexpected 
earnings variances are not homogeneous across 
firms and the ERCs are negatively related to 
these firm-specific variances. More impor-
tantly, the homogeneity test also shows that 
variances of FC firms are more heterogeneous 
than those of SE firms and thereby ERC 
estimates of FC firms are unduly downward 
biased. This result explains the statistically 
significant higher ERC for SE firms when 
pooled cross-sectional models are estimated.  
As Teets and Wasley (1996) suggest, if 
there is a systematic relation between the firm-
specific coefficients and firm-specific time-
series unexpected earnings variances, any 
differences in estimates will not be random. 
They further suggest that before using pooled 
estimation, the equality of coefficients or 
unexpected variances and the relation between 
ERCs and unexpected earnings should be 
tested. When the equality and no-relation 
hypotheses are rejected, the pooled estimation 
model may be misspecified and results in 
inaccurate estimates and incorrect inferences 
about the magnitudes of and the differences in 
ERCs across groups of firms. 
The above specification tests suggest that 
the firm-specific estimations are more appro-
priate than the pooled estimations. Therefore, 
the general conclusion is that the ERCs for FC 
firms are higher than (or at least the same as) 
the ERCs for SE firms. This conclusion par-
tially supports the findings by Duchac and 
Douthett (1995) who use earnings levels 
analysis. Also, this conclusion is more in line 
with the descriptive result that forecasts for the 
FC firms are more accurate than forecasts for 
the SE firms. 
One limitation in this note is that 
unexpected earnings (AUEs) are measured as 
residual errors of a cross-sectional model 
[equation (2)]. Ideally, such equation should be 
estimated for each individual firm. However, 
the number of observations available for each 
firm do not warrant such an attempt. Further 
research should apply this approach when 
sufficient data become available. Subject to 
this limitation and other shortcomings 
described in SWD1, the results of this note 
provides some insights into the debate on the 
merits of full cost and successful efforts 
accounting methods. This note implies that the 
FC method produces a quality of earnings at 
least as good as that of the SE method. 
Therefore, the argument for a single SE 
method to account for exploration costs on the 
basis of earnings quality and usefulness is not 
fully and empirically supported in this research 
note. Thus, this note supports the argument 
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that managers should be given a discretion to 
choose accounting methods that best reflect 
managers’ private information and expec-
tations about their firms’ economic status and 
prospects. Whether SE method can be imposed 
on the basis of uniformity, as suggested by the 
FASB, is an unresolved empirical question. 
This research note confirms the general 
suggestion of Teets and Wasley (1996) that 
before using pooled estimation, the equality of 
coefficients or unexpected variances and the 
relation between ERCs and unexpected 
earnings should be tested. When the equality 
and no-relation hypotheses are rejected, the 
pooled estimation models may be misspecified 
and may result in incorrect estimates and 
inferences about the magnitudes and 
differences in ERCs across groups of firms.  
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